Volume 44
Issue 3 Summer 2004
Summer 2004

Evaluating and Enhancing Competition in the Interstate Natural
Gas Transporation Industry
Michael J. Doane
R. Preston McAfee
Michael A. Williams

Recommended Citation
Michael J. Doane, R. P. McAfee & Michael A. Williams, Evaluating and Enhancing Competition in the
Interstate Natural Gas Transporation Industry, 44 Nat. Resources J. 761 (2004).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol44/iss3/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

MICHAEL J. DOANE', R. PRESTON McAFEE** &
MICHAEL A. WILLIAMS*

Evaluating and Enhancing
Competition in the Interstate Natural
Gas Transportation Industry
ABSTRACT
In 1996, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
established criteria it uses when evaluating proposalsfor marketbased rates by naturalgas pipelines. Since that time, a number of
significant developments have occurred, both in markets for
natural gas transportation and in economic tools for marketpower assessment. This article will review the current approach
for measuring interstate pipeline market power presented in the
1996 Policy Statement of the FERC and will critically evaluate
that framework in light of these recent developments. We show
that fundamental changes in the operation of natural gas
transportation markets and new developments in the economic
analysis of market power suggest that the Commission's
methodology for assessing market power actually or potentially
exercisable by pipelines seeking market-based rates is, as it
currently stands, inappropriateand should be updated in light of
new developments. As we discuss below, the Commission's
approach fails to account for a number of important factors
potentially influencing a determination of market power.
Consequently, the goals of this article are (1) to apply
economically appropriate criteria to current natural gas
transportationmarkets in order to illustratehow to evaluate their
competitiveness and (2) to demonstrate that improving the
competitive assessment of pipelines competing in those markets
could enhance consumer welfare.
I. INTRODUCTION
A marked transformation of the natural gas industry has
occurred in recent decades, primarily facilitated by the issuance of two
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orders from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or the
Commission). FERC Order No. 436, released in 1985, encouraged
interstate pipeline companies to separate their sales and transportation
functions in order to provide producers and purchasers of natural gas
with more options for trading; the order also established rules governing
open access.' FERC Order No. 636, released in 1992, required interstate
pipelines to unbundle their gas and transportation functions, to cease
selling bundled gas supplies, and to provide comparable transportation
to all shippers regardless of whether or not the shipper had also
purchased gas from that pipeline. 2 Additionally, the Commission has
spurred the development of a secondary market for unbundled
transportation capacity by allowing holders of interstate pipeline
capacity to "release" their capacity for resale to other shippers and
requiring pipelines to offer shippers on their systems flexibility in
identifying receipt and delivery points. Transportation capacity sold in
the capacity-release market can be either firm (sometimes sold subject to
recall rights held by the primary capacity holder) or interruptible. Firm
capacity rights cannot be taken by the pipeline from the shipper, except
in extraordinary circumstances, during the term of the contract, whereas
interruptible capacity can be taken by the pipeline on short notice from
the shipper. In February of 2000, the Commission further promoted a
more liquid and transparent market by releasing Order No. 637, which,
among other things, increases the amount of information pipelines are
required to post on their websites regarding capacity release (excess
capacity) and requires pipelines to allow shippers to segment their
3
capacity where operationally feasible to do so.
These shifts have necessitated a new look at the regulation of
interstate natural gas pipelines. The FERC's 1996 Statement of Policy and
Requestfor Comments (Policy Statement) discusses multiple alternatives to
cost-of-service ratemaking in detail, including criteria for implementing
market-based rates.4 The Policy Statement traces these policy
developments back to 1989, when Congress directed the commission to
1. FERC Order No. 436, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead
Decontrol, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408 (Oct. 18, 1985).
2. FERC Order No. 636, Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations
Governing Self-Implementing Transportation and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines
After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,267 (Apr. 16, 1992).
3. FERC Order No. 637, Regulation of Short-Term Natural Gas Transportation
Services, and Regulation of Interstate Natural Gas Transportation Services, 65 Fed. Reg.
10,156 (Feb. 25, 2000).
4. Statement of Policy and Request for Comments, Alternatives to Traditional Costof-Service Ratemaking for Natural Gas Pipelines, 74 F.E.R.C. 61,076 (1996) [hereinafter
Policy Statement].
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improve the competitive structure of the natural gas industry "in order
to maximize the benefits of [wellhead] decontrol." 5 Orders Nos. 436 and
636 took steps in this direction, increasing the availability of unbundled
transportation and promoting integration of natural gas markets. 6 The
effect of these policies has been a shift away from traditional methods of
acquiring gas supplies, such that many consumers of gas transportation
now require less firm capacity than they have in the past. In this new
environment, the Commission acknowledges, additional rate flexibility
may be necessary -hence the Commission's establishment of criteria for
market-based transportation rates.
According to the Policy Statement, market-based transportation
rates are a suitable means for achieving the goal of flexibility, but only in
those cases where a natural gas pipeline company can demonstrate that
it lacks market power.7 Defining market power as "the ability of a
pipeline to profitably maintain prices above the competitive levels for a
significant period of time," the FERC has proposed a number of criteria
for assessing market power and judging when market-based rate
proposals are appropriate.8 These criteria have generated a fair amount
of comment, with commentators disagreeing over the degree to which
these criteria may be appropriate, insufficient, or overly strenuous. 9
Some observers have expressed uncertainty that many companies' firm
transportation (FT) service would meet the proposed criteria. 10 This
concern appears to be reasonable, given that no pipeline is currently

5. H.R. Rep. No. 29, 101st Cong. 6 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 51.
6. FERC Order No. 436, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408; FERC Order No. 636, 57, 57 Fed. Reg.
13,267.
7. Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 61,228-29.
8. Id. at 61,230.
9. Id. at 61,231-36.
10. As the Conunission explained, "Many commenters recognized.. that it is unlikely
that the primary market, i.e., firm transportation by interstate pipeline companies, will
meet the proposed criteria for market-based rates." Policy Statement, supra note 4, at
61,227. Such commenters included Brooklyn Union; Connecticut Natural; IPAMS; Illinois,
Ohio PUC; Tejas; Atlanta Gas; Columbia Distribution; Northern Distributors; NI-Gas; UDC;
Amoco; NGSA; Texaco; PA. OCA; and PaPUC. See id. at 61,227 n.18. According to FERC,
the "majority of pipeline commenters, along with a few others, indicated that the criteria
were too strenuous and ignore competitive factors." Id. at 61,227. While some
commentators on the market-based rates criteria have also questioned whether the
Commission possesses the legal authority to establish such a policy, the Commission
explains these criticisms as an overly narrow reading of the case law. See id. at 61,228.
Furthermore, the Commission cites Farmers Union Central Exchange v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486,
1509 (D.C. 1991), in which the Court noted that a shift toward light-handed regulation is
reasonable, so long as the policy objectives of the regulatory statute in question are
attainable under the new approach. Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 61,228 (citing Farmers
Union, 734 F.2d at 1509).
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permitted by the Commission to charge market-based transportation
rates." Indeed, following the Commission's rejection of an application
for market-based rates submitted by Gulf South, a subsidiary of EntergyKoch,12 pipelines have largely stopped seeking such permission. This
outcome is perhaps not surprising given that Koch's pipeline operates in
the Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama area, which is densely
populated with natural gas pipelines.
Fundamental changes in the operation of natural gas transportation markets and new developments in the economic analysis of
market power suggest that the Commission's methodology for assessing
market power actually or potentially exercisable by pipelines seeking
market-based rates is, as it currently stands, inappropriate. As we
discuss below, the Commission's approach fails to account for a number
of important factors potentially influencing a determination of market
power. Consequently, the goals of this article are (1) to apply
economically appropriate criteria to current natural gas transportation
markets in order to evaluate their competitiveness and (2) to demonstrate that consumer welfare could be enhanced by improving the
antitrust analysis of pipelines competing in those markets. We begin by
identifying the industry context in which the Commission's decisions are
now to be made. We then describe in detail the Commission's current
approach to market power analysis with regard to natural gas
transportation, drawing attention both to its strengths and weaknesses.
These weaknesses are then explicitly discussed and certain advances in
the economic analysis of market power that promise to address and
correct these shortcomings are highlighted.
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY
There have been a number of specific developments in the
natural gas industry since the FERC implemented its open access policies
that bear significantly upon the operation of natural gas transportation
markets. As the Commission noted in Order No. 637, recent trends in the
gas industry following open access include such things as the following:

11. The Commission has approved market-based rates for storage services. See, e.g., K
N Interstate Gas Transmission Company Order on Rehearing, 77 F.E.R.C. 61,256 (1996); K
N Interstate Gas Transmission Company Declaratory Order and Order on Rehearing, 76
F.E.R.C. 61,134 (1996); and K N Interstate Gas Transmission Company Order Rejecting
Tariff Sheets and Providing for Further Procedures, 68 F.E.R.C. 61,401 (1994).
12. Koch Gateway Pipeline Company Order Reversing Initial Decision, 85 F.E.R.C.
61,013 (1998), rehearing denied, 89 F.E.R.C. 61,046 (1999) [hereinafter Koch Gateway Order].
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growth in wholesale markets; 13
changes to the transportation market, most notably the
availability of released capacity traded by means of
14
electronic bulletin boards;
the development of an integrated and active spot market
that is broad in geographic scope;"5
the appearance of upstream and downstream market
16
centers or "hubs";
the development of an active financial market in gas
17
futures;
lower prices without any threat to reliability; 18 and
"the development of virtual pipelines.. .creating in effect
a new pipeline between receipt and delivery points that
are not physically connected under a single pipeline
management."19

These developments have facilitated exchange and have
increased the transparency of prices in gas commodity and
transportation markets. As will be discussed more fully below, one
repercussion of this is that the gas wellhead market (that is, the market
for natural gas extraction) has become unified, national in scope, and
increasingly competitive since the institution of open access.
A. Wholesale Markets and Capacity Release
As noted above, the Commission allows holders of interstate
pipeline capacity to release their capacity for resale to other shippers.
The development of secondary markets for such "capacity release" has
had a profound influence on natural gas transportation as a whole.20 This
influence is easy to understand given the advantages such capacity
13. FERC Order No. 637, 65 Fed. Reg. at 10,158.
14. Id. at 10,165.
15. Id. at 10,173.
16. Id. at 10,162.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. FERC Order No. 637, 65 Fed. Reg. at 10,162.
20. In addition to acquiring transportation service via capacity release, buyers can
purchase delivered gas in the "gray market" from gas brokers who arrange for deliveries
using their own transportation arrangements. The rise of such gray markets is yet another
development reducing the potential exercise of market power by a pipeline. Frederick
Moring, FERC Order No. 637-A Partial Review, NAT. GAS (2000), at http://www.crowell.
com/content/resources/ publications/ art ng. fmorder63700.html (last visited Nov. 16,
2004).
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release programs offer to shippers. In 1996, the Energy Information
Administration (EIA) of the U.S. Department of Energy articulated a
number of these benefits, listing the following as advantages accruing to
"replacement" shippers that purchase released capacity:
o Moderate lead time required. The acquisition of capacity on the
release market requires very little lead time. This allows the replacement
shipper to use the capacity release market to satisfy incremental loads
economically instead of subscribing to firm capacity that may be
underutilized. 21
e Flexible terms with respect to duration of contract. The replacement
shipper can acquire capacity for the period it will be needed instead of
being constrained by standard contract periods. 22
e Ability to obtain capacity. The replacement shipper is able to
23
obtain capacity even when the pipeline is fully subscribed.
* Release capacity is usually priced below tariff rates. The
replacement shipper can acquire capacity at a fraction of the maximum
regulated rate. 24
Since 1996, the Commission has taken several steps to enhance
the efficiency of transactions for capacity release. For example, in Order
No. 587, the Commission adopted regulations to standardize the
business practices and communication methodologies of interstate
natural gas pipelines to enhance the integration and efficiency of the U.S.
pipeline grid. 25 As a result of the enhanced efficiency of the capacity
release transactions, shippers have increasingly become able to obtain
short-term (as well as long-term) firm transportation capacity in
capacity-release deals, and the percentage of interstate throughput
moved under released capacity contracts has grown considerably. In
1996, for example, the same year in which the FERC's Policy Statement
was issued, the EIA already observed that "[t]he release market has
grown steadily in terms of capacity traded, indicating that shippers are
becoming experienced in capacity trading." 26 In a more recent version of
this report, the EIA again noted:
21. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., NATURAL GAS 1996: IssuEs AND TRENDS 42 (1996)
[hereinafter EIA], available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil-gas/natural-gas/analysispublications/natural_gas issuesand-trends/it96.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2004) [hereinafter EIA].
22. Id. at 43.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Standards for Business Practices of Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines, Order No. 587,
61 Fed. Reg. 39,053 (July 17, 1996).
26. EIA, supra note 21, at 43.
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The capacity release market has grown steadily in terms of
capacity traded, indicating that more shippers are using the
release market as a source for transportation capacity. The
release market's annual growth rate averaged 19 percent
during the past 3 heating years (April through March)
ended March 31, 1998, for the interstate pipeline companies
27
included in this analysis.
Given the benefits of capacity release identified above and the
rapid increase in the volume of traded capacity, one might expect the
role of services such as interruptible transportation to have diminished
as capacity release markets have matured. Indeed, it appears that the
growth in short-term and long-term capacity release has led to a
commensurate reduction in the share of interruptible transportation.
According to the most recently available data from EIA, interruptible
transportation accounted for less than ten percent of total U.S. gas
deliveries in 1997, compared with more than 50 percent in the mid1980s. 28 Thus, the relative volume of interruptible transportation services
has declined markedly in recent years, and this decline appears to be
primarily attributable to competition from shippers offering released
capacity.
B. Market Integration
The restructuring of the natural gas industry has led to the
development of an active and integrated spot market (a market
characterized by immediate, short-term, specified volume contracts).
This market integration has carried with it a number of implications for
natural gas transportation rates. Evidence for this claim comes from a
number of economic studies that have taken place over the past decade
and have investigated the extent to which natural gas markets have
become integrated under the open access regime. Generally speaking,
the consensus is as we have already noted: markets for natural gas
transportation in the United States have become increasingly interconnected, and this integration has had an impact on the ability to set
price. In 1993, for example, DeVany and Walls examined evidence from
190 origin and destination market pairs "to see if open access has
succeeded in bringing gas markets under the control of competition." 29
27.

ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,

NATURAL GAS 1998: ISSUES AND TRENDS 141 (1999)

[hereinafter EIA 1998]. The EIA has not updated its "Issues and Trends" report since 1999.
28. Id.
29. Arthur DeVany & W. David Walls, Pipeline Access and Market Integration in the
Natural Gas Industry: Evidencefrom CointegrationTests, 14 ENERGY J. 2 (1993).
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According to their findings, "these market-pairs have become
increasingly integrated as the network of pipelines has become more
connected during the era of open access." 30 A few years later, DeVany
and Walls again reported on the natural gas industry, concluding that
"[s]pot markets in the city gates, pipeline hubs, and production fields,
that are scattered over distant points in the vast pipeline network in the
31
United States, now form a single market."
In 1998, Serletis also refuted the notion that natural gas markets
were split between the eastern and western regions of the country.
Pointing to common trends in North American natural gas spot markets,
Serletis concluded that such an east-west divide did not exist. 32 Similarly,
a 1994 paper by Doane and Spulber observed monthly spot price data
from 1984 to 1991 in order to determine price correlations, Granger
causality, and cointegration. 33 Based on these analyses, the authors
concluded that "open access [has] integrated the regional wellhead
markets into a national competitive market for natural gas," noting
open-access
actions promoting
that "[r]egulatory
specifically
open
market
transportation have resulted in new distribution channels,
competition for gas supplies, and a drastically altered role for pipeline
companies." 34
In short, open access has integrated previously disparate natural
gas markets, resulting in a more competitive marketplace for buyers and
sellers of gas. Since the price of gas in a producing region is generally the
delivered price of gas to a destination area less the cost of transportation,
price movements in the integrated market have become highly
correlated, even though the price of gas can vary from producing region
to producing region. 35 The presence of high correlation among spot
prices of different geographic areas at varying distances from source

30. Id.
31. Arthur DeVany & W. David Walls, The Law of One Priceon a Network: Arbitrage and
Price Dynamics in Natural Gas City Gate Markets, 36 J. REG'L SCI. 555 (1996).
32. Apostolos Serletis, Is There an East-West Split in North America Gas Markets?, 18
ENERGY J. 47 (1998). On occasion, natural gas prices in Southern California have diverged
from those in Northern California as a result of capacity constraints on El Paso Pipeline and
Southern California Gas Company. Narrative Summary of the Prepared Direct Testimony and
Exhibits of Dr. Jonathan D. Ogur on Behalf of Commission Staff, Hearing Before the Fed. Energy
Reg. Comm'n, 107th Cong. 9 (2001) (No. RP0O-241-000) (statement of Dr. Jonathan D. Ogur,
economist) [hereinafter Statement of Dr. Jonathan D. Ogur], availableat http://elibrary.ferc.
gov/idmws/nvcommon/NVViewer.asp?Doc=5550:0 (last visited Aug. 24, 2004).
33. Michael J. Doane & Daniel F. Spulber, Open Access and the Evolution of the U.S. Spot
Marketfor Natural Gas, 37 J.L. & ECON. 477, 513 (1994).
34. Id. at 477-78.
35. Id. at 489.
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locations demonstrates the existence of a broad geographic market for
36
natural gas.
In a competitive market, prices tend to be the same, net of
transportation costs. 37 Stated another way, the geographic scope of a
market is often characterized as the region within which prices of
comparable goods net of transportation costs tend toward equality. If
prices differ across regions, sellers can profit by moving products from
low-price areas to high-price areas; such arbitrage will continue until
price differences have been eliminated. 38 Thus, in a single market, such
movement occurs until opportunities for arbitrage are exhausted, i.e.,
buyers cannot turn to other sellers to obtain lower prices (net of
transportation costs) and sellers cannot turn to other buyers to obtain
higher prices (net of transportation costs). In the gas market, sellers
generally can reach a customer over different routes from different
sources, and, given opportunities for arbitrage, prices tend not to exceed
the competitive level for long. Thus, in the case of natural gas, the
freedom to engage in arbitrage between geographic locations places
constraints on the rates charged by pipelines for transportation services.
C. Market Centers and Hubs
As noted above, new trading models have emerged since the
introduction of open access by the FERC. One such model is the
development of "market centers" (or "hubs"). A market center "provides
customers (shippers and gas marketers primarily) with receipt/ delivery
access to two or more pipeline systems, provides transportation between
these points, and offers administrative services that facilitate that
movement and/or transfer of gas ownership." 39 A logical outgrowth of
open-access restructuring, market centers provide locations at which
shippers can buy and sell natural gas, pipeline transportation services,
and storage capacity. Among other features, market centers provide
short-term gas "loans" for shippers delivering too little volume and

36. Id. at 493. Arbitrage causes the prices to be highly correlated, which demonstrates
the existence of a broad economic market.
37. This long-established proposition is often referred to as the "law of one price."
ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIcs 341-42 (8th ed. Macmillan 1948) (1890).

38. The natural gas market itself is an illustration of this market development. That is,
arbitrage effectively eliminates inter-regional price differences within the United States for
natural gas. See, e.g., Michael J. Doane & Daniel F. Spulber, Open Access and the Evolution of
the U.S. Spot Market for Natural Gas, 37 J. L. & ECON. 477 (1994).
39.

JAMES TOBIN, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., NATURAL GAS MARKET CENTERS AND HUBS: A

2003 UPDATE (2003), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil-gas/natural.-gas/
feature.articles/2003/market-hubs/mkthubsweb.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2004).
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temporary gas "parking" for shippers delivering too much, both of
which help to satisfy the balancing requirements of the transporting
pipeline. In addition, market centers routinely provide title transfer, gas
trading, electronic trading, and administrative services to facilitate
transactions among purchasers, producers, and transporters of natural
gas.40 There are currently 37 operational market centers in the United
States and Canada. 41 These hubs have facilitated the development of
increasingly competitive natural gas transportation markets by
providing locations where many natural gas shippers can trade and
42
receive value-added services.
The development of market centers has improved the "price
discovery" process, i.e., the process of determining market prices through
the interactions of buyers and sellers in the marketplace. As noted by
EIA, "The availability of market centers has enabled more buyers to seek
out the least expensive sources of supply, while providing sellers with a
platform to reach those buyers who are willing to pay the most attractive
price." 43 The efficiency of the price-discovery process clearly depends on
the accuracy of reported prices. Following the collapse of Enron's online
energy trading operations in 2001, the validity of some reported gas
prices was closely scrutinized. Some evidence suggested that certain gas
traders reported erroneous prices in an effort to influence market
behavior. 44 Following these revelations, the FERC and the Commodities
Future Trading Commission (CFTC) promulgated voluntary guidelines
for reporting gas prices so that future such attempts to bias reported gas
prices should be reduced or eliminated. 45 Moreover, even the reported
efforts to influence reported gas prices so as to create arbitrage
opportunities would not affect futures prices, as discussed in the next
section.
D. Financial Markets for Gas Futures
The introduction of open access has spurred an active market for
the trading of natural gas futures, which both provides an effective
hedging instrument for natural gas prices and assists in the creation of a
more efficient market for transportation. This is because futures trading
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See EIA, supra note 21, at 63, 66-76.
43. TOBIN, supra note 39.
44. Id.
45. Policy Statement on Natural Gas and Electric Indices, 104 F.E.R.C. 61,121 (July 24,
2003). The guidelines ask, for example, that a developer of natural gas price indices adopt a
code of conduct that discloses how the developer obtains, treats, and maintains price data.
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efficiently distributes information and can equalize prices between
regions even when the regions are only indirectly or infrequently
connected. 46 Futures markets allow for both physical deliveries as well as
contracts that can be used to hedge against risk. For example, gas futures
can be purchased and traded at the New York Mercantile Exchange
(NYMEX), which "makes available for trading a series of basis swap
futures contracts that are quoted as price differentials between
47
approximately 30 natural gas pricing points and Henry Hub."
Although financial instruments are not part of physical gas supply, they
provide a means to address alternative forms of risk, including risks that
transportation services will be unexpectedly overpriced or unavailable.
A futures contract is an effective hedging instrument when it
reduces the variance of the hedger's total position (cash and futures
combined), and it does that best when the variation in the futures price
explains all or most of the variation in the spot price. Empirical studies
have shown that futures markets are competitive and yield prices that
provide accurate information to buyers and sellers on the relative
scarcity of goods.48 In this case, the spot prices and future prices are
linked, and the future price is a good predictor of the direction of spot
prices at a later date. For example, based on a 1995 analysis of 13 spot
markets located during the period, DeVany and Walls concluded that
the natural gas futures market yields reliable and unbiased prices, and
futures contracts provide market participants with an effective tool to
49
hedge the risk of unexpected price movements.
E. Other Recent Developments
The natural gas industry has continued to evolve since the
Commission issued its Policy Statement in 1996. The issuance of FERC
Order No. 637 in February of 2000 further increases efficiency and
competition in the transportation market, in part by enhancing shippers'
ability to segment capacity and improving the operation of imbalance
management tools, penalties, operational flow orders, and reporting and

46.

See, e.g., Doane & Spulber, supra note 33, at 513.

47.

NEW YORK MERCANTILE EXCHANGE, NATURAL GAS, at http://www.nymex.com/

jsp/markets/ng-pre-agree.jsp (last visited Aug. 25, 2004). The Henry Hub is a pipeline
interchange on the Louisiana Gulf coast.
48. Michael Hartzmark, Luck Versus ForecastAbility: Determinants of Trader Performance
in Futures Markets, 64 J. OF Bus. 49-72 (1991); Charles Cox, Futures Trading and Market
Information, 84 J. POL. ECON. 1215 (1976).
49. ARTHUR S. DEVANY & W. DAVID WALLS, THE EMERGING NEW ORDER IN NATURAL
GAS: MARKETS VERSUS REGULATION 91 (1995).
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posting requirements.50 These provisions have enhanced the
transparency and liquidity of transportation markets.
To summarize, the Commission's open-access efforts have
transformed the natural gas industry. Upstream and downstream market
centers have appeared, and these hubs have continued to grow, both in
number and in the range of services offered. The trading of released
capacity by means of electronic bulletin boards has fundamentally
changed transportation markets. More generally, the growth in access to
pipeline bulletin boards and websites (and growth in the standardization
and detail of the information presented on those websites) allows for
more transparency in the natural gas industry and makes it possible for a
wider set of users to evaluate and acquire alternative transportation
routes. In addition, a growing market for gas futures, options, and
derivative contracts further facilitates price transparency and
transactional flexibility. These and related developments have facilitated
exchange and have increased the transparency of prices in gas
commodity and transportation markets.51 A May 2001 EIA report
regarding "recent trends and prospects for the future" of U.S. natural gas
markets aptly summarizes these developments:
The natural gas pipeline network has grown substantially
since 1990, with more than 20 billion cubic feet per day of
interregional capacity (a 27-percent increase) added
through the end of 2000. The network has also become
more interconnected, its routings more complex, and
business operations more efficient. New types of facilities,
such as market centers, and established operations, such as
underground storage facilities, have become further
integrated into the national pipeline grid, allowing the
system to operate with greater flexibility. The restructuring
of the industry has changed the way in which network
resources are used and has caused some shift in transportation routes and trading and shipping arrangements,
52
but system reliability has continued to improve.
As a result of reduced regulation in the natural gas industry,
pipeline capacity has been more efficiently utilized during peak and offpeak periods, real operating and maintenance expenses have fallen,
50. FERC Order No. 637, 65 Fed. Reg. at 10,156.
51. Id. § I(B)(2)(a).
52.

ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,

U.S.

NATURAL GAS MARKETS:

RECENT TRENDS AND

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 16 (May 2001), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/
servicerpt/naturalgas/pdf/oiafOO102.pdf (last visited Aug.25, 2004).
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prices for residential and industrial customers have more accurately
informed buyers and sellers of the relative scarcity of natural gas and gas
transportation, and service has become more reliable. 53 As discussed in
the remainder of this article, these changes, taken together, counsel for a
reconsideration of the way in which competitiveness and market power
is measured in the transportation of natural gas.
III. FERC'S METHOD OF EVALUATING MARKET POWER IN
NATURAL GAS PIPELINES
In its 1996 Policy Statement, the Commission provided guidance
on the framework it is to apply when evaluating proposals for marketbased rates. According to the Commission, that framework is intended to
address two principal questions: "(1) whether the applicant can withhold or restrict services and, as a result, increase price by a significant
amount for a significant period of time, and (2) whether the applicant
can discriminate unduly in price or terms and conditions."54 For the
Commission to determine that the applicant cannot engage in these
practices, it must determine either that the availability of "good
alternatives" prevents the achievement and exercise of market power or,
where market power exists, that acceptable mitigation conditions have
been proposed. The Commission proceeds to analyze market power in
three steps:
* definition of the relevant markets, both product and
geographic;
* measure of a firm's market share and market
concentration; and
* evaluation of entry conditions, buyer power, and other
55
relevant factors.
As discussed below, the relevant product market for the
purposes of a FERC market-power inquiry includes the services that are
"good alternatives" to the applicant's service. Generally speaking, for an
alternative to qualify as a "good" one, it must be available with sufficient timeliness, at a low enough price, and at a high enough quality to
allow substitution with the applicant's service.

53. Clifford Winston, U.S. Industry Adjustment to Economic Deregulation, 12 J. ECON.
PERSP. 89-110 (1998).
54. Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 61,230.
55. Id.
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A. Product Market Definition
The FERC's determination of which products constitute a
relevant market is based on the concept of "good alternatives." 56 A good
alternative to a given pipeline's service is one that "is available soon
enough, has a price that is low enough, and has a quality high enough to
permit customers to substitute the alternative" for the pipeline's
service. 57 The implication is that the product market consists of the
applicant pipeline's service, together with other services that are deemed
to be "good alternatives" on the basis of price, quality of service, and
timeliness of availability.
Under the FERC's evaluation scheme, asking whether or not a
service constitutes a good alternative on the basis of price is equivalent to
asking whether or not the price for available capacity is sufficiently low
to restrain the applicant seeking market-based rates from increasing its
prices. According to the Commission, a price differential of up to ten
percent is sufficient to meet this test -that is, in order for a product to be
included in the market as a good alternative, its price must be no more
than ten percent greater than the applicant pipeline's approved maximum cost-based rate.58 Explaining this threshold, the Commission has
commented that, "if a company can sustain an increase in its rates in the
order of 10 percent or more without losing significant market share, the
company is in a position to exercise market power to the detriment of the
public interest." 59 Nevertheless, the Commission entertains arguments
from firms, on a case-by-case basis, that the threshold should be higher
60
or lower in a given market.
With regard to quality, the Commission maintains that a service
must have a level of quality "at least as high as that of the service
provided by the applicant" in order to be considered a good alternative
to the applicant's offering. 61 The FERC requires that applicants for
market-based rates submit a full description of the services to which
market-based rates will be applied in order to determine the relative
quality of potential alternatives. 62 The Commission believes that the FT
service of all interstate pipelines is presently comparable, but variation in
the overall package of services may exist. 63 As a practical matter,
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 61,231.
Id.
Id. at 61,232.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 61,236.
For example, the availability of no-notice service may be limited to certain firms.
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however, FERC generally presumes that this condition of comparable
quality is met in the case of certain transportation services offered by
interstate pipelines. Specifically, it notes that, in the "aftermath of Orders
Nos. 436 and 636, the Commission believes that all interstate pipelines
currently provide operationally comparable firm transportation
service." 64 For a pipeline to establish that interruptible transportation (IT)
service is a good alternative to firm transportation service, however, the
Commission recommends that the pipeline "demonstrate that an
adequate amount of capacity is unsubscribed during peak periods so
that the quality of the IT service is comparable to that of the applicant's
65
FT service."
Finally, there is typically an element of time associated with
market definition. While antitrust authorities traditionally consider one
year to be the time frame in which a service must become available to
qualify as a substitute, FERC's Policy Statement does not specify such a
time period for gas service substitutes. According to the Policy Statement, the specific service at issue will determine the appropriate time
horizon. 66 The Policy Statement also cautions applicants that the mere
existence of an alternative is insufficient, unless an applicant can
demonstrate the availability of capacity on that alternative. 67 As
discussed in section IV.C.3, infra, this criterion is flawed from an antitrust
perspective. The Commission has offered few guidelines regarding the
evaluation of potentially good alternatives on the basis of timeliness of
availability. Indeed, the Policy Statement does not define a specific time
period within which a product must become available in order to be
considered a substitute, stating instead that such a determination is
"dependent on the type of product [or] services at issue." 68 Nevertheless,
the Policy Statement cautions pipeline applicants reliant on capacity not
immediately available that they should not commit customers to long69
term contracts on their systems within the delay period.
B. Geographic Market Definition
Once the product market is established, the next step is to
determine the relevant geographic market. The FERC notes that this is
especially important in transportation service markets, as pipelines

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 61,232.
Id.
Id. at 61,231.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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transport gas out of an origin (producing) region and into a destination
(consuming) region. 70 Therefore, both the origin market and destination
market must be identified. Accordingly, the Policy Statement indicates
that applicants' proposals should generally adopt a two-step approach to
geographic market definition. First, "alternative sellers who offer service
71
between the same origin and destination markets" must be identified.
Second, "competitors that provide service either out of the origin market
72
or into the destination market" must be identified.
The first step serves to recognize sellers offering service on the
same route as the applicant. According to FERC, focusing on pipelines
on the same route simplifies the analysis, as this circumvents the
question of whether different origin regions are good alternatives to each
other. 73 To successfully demonstrate that another pipeline on the same
path offers a good alternative to the applicant's pipeline, an applicant
must demonstrate that the alternative pipeline could provide the
relevant service. 74 The alternative pipeline must have both the capacity
and services necessary to use the competitor's facilities in both origin
and destination markets over the term of market-based service rates. 75
Parallel alternative pipelines are also important, the Commission argues,
if a customer is under contractual obligation to take or deliver gas at
specific receipt or delivery points. The Commission cautions, however,
that while the purchase and sale of gas on the spot market could meet
contractual obligations where necessary, the prices and availability of
76
spot gas may be unreliable.
The second step reflects the existence of alternate destinations
markets to which an upstream shipper could send gas, as well as a
downstream shipper's choice among multiple origin markets from which
to buy gas. These alternatives may further limit the potential market
power of a pipeline. 77 Therefore, a market-based rate applicant must
identify all competing pipelines that move gas out of the origin market
and all competing pipelines that move gas into the destination market.
Generally, the Commission states, alternative pipelines must be
physically connected to the shipper in question to be included in the
70. Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 61,232-33.
71. Id. at 61,233.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 61,231.
76. Id.
77. If, for example, there are alternative pipelines serving the same origin, the
producer has alternative buyers, which limits the ability of any individual pipeline serving
that producer.
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origin market.78 That said, other pipelines may be included so long as a
connection to the shipper could be constructed for sufficiently low cost
to yield netback prices to the shipper that are as high under the
alternative as they would be with the applicant's pipeline. The
Commission does not explicitly state its criteria for defining a destination
market. 79
Natural gas pipelines should be allowed to charge market-based
rates when there is sufficient competition to protect buyers of
transportation services from the exercise of significant and durable
market power. Generally speaking, purchasers of transportation services
fall into one of two categories -natural gas sellers and natural gas
buyers-and both need to be protected from the exercise of market
power by the providers of transportation.80 Such protection is afforded
by the presence of good alternatives to the services of a given
transportation supplier, but the "goodness" of an alternative from the
perspective of a shipper largely depends upon the shipper's position as a
seller or buyer of the transported gas. Since alternatives are to be
considered for both transportation from and transportation to a shipper,
the appropriate notion of a market is a geographic location where gas is
either received or delivered. Such a geographic area should be as large as
economic substitution dictates. In the case of natural gas transportation,
which is characterized by multiple receipt and delivery points integrated
into a larger pipeline distribution system, the relevant geographic
market should arguably include the system as a whole.
The Commission posits another potential definition of the
relevant geographic market, but this additional definition is problematic
from an antitrust perspective given how the natural gas industry works.
According to the Commission, pipelines (1) transport gas out of a
producing or origin region, (2) deliver gas into a consuming or
destination region, and (3) transport gas between the two. 81 Accordingly,
when evaluating a firm's application to charge market-based rates, the
FERC considers that a "market" delineated by a specific pair of delivery
and receipt areas and a particular delivery path connecting them may
constitute the relevant geographic market. 82 According to the
Commission, such a "path market" would consist of the applicant and all
other sellers of transportation service that could provide a good
78. Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 61,233.
79. Id. at 61,233-34.
80. Of course, gas traders, or arbitragers, both buy and sell gas.
81. Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 61,233.
82. Id. at 61,234. Under this market definition approach, gas transportation service
between Henry Hub and Chicago, for example, constitutes a relevant geographic market.
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alternative to the applicant's service between the specific pair of receipt
and delivery areas and over a comparable route.8 3 In order to show that
another pipeline using the same route has a "good alternative" service,
an applicant must demonstrate that "capacity would be available on the
alternative [pipeline] and that the customer can obtain any services
needed to use the competitor's facilities in both origin and destination
markets over the term of the service receiving market-based rates." 84 An
alternative pipeline meeting these requirements would be included,
under the Commission's methodology, in the same relevant geographic
market as that of the applicant.
As discussed in greater detail below, such so-called "path
markets" are not markets in any relevant economic sense. They do not
accurately capture the good alternatives actually available to shippers
and thus should not be adopted as a definition of the relevant
geographic market for antitrust analysis.
C. Measurement of Market Share and Market Concentration
Market power studies commonly make use of a statistic known
as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure the level of
concentration among suppliers in a market.85 Indeed, the HHI is the way
that market concentration is usually assessed and is the statistic
employed by the Commission in its Policy Statement. 86 The HHI is
calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the
market and then summing the resulting numbers.8 7 This index is based
on an equation arising out of a simple model of competition, called the
Cournot model. In that model, the proportion of the price that is a
83. Id.
84. Id. at 61,233.
85. Id. at 61,234.
86. Id.
87. For example, for a market consisting of three firms with shares of 20 percent, 30
percent, and 50 percent, the HHI is equal to 2900-that is, equal to 202 + 302 + 402. The HHI
thus takes into account the relative size and distribution of firms in the market and
approaches zero when a market consists of a large number of firms of relatively equal size.
Conversely, the HiHI increases both as the number of firms in the market decreases and as
the disparity in size between firms increases; an HHI of 10,000, which results from squaring

a single share of 100 percent, thus represents a monopoly. When using and reporting the
HHI, it has become common to sum the shares in percentage terms (e.g., 30 percent),
although the formula justifying the use of the HHI requires expressing the shares in

proportion (e.g., 0.30). Using shares expressed as proportions, the HHI has a possible range
from near 0.0, in the case of perfect competition, to 1.0 for monopoly. In this article, we
follow the convention used by the FERC, which expresses shares in percentage terms and
implies a range for the HHI of 0 to 10,000. See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M.
PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 344 (2d ed. 1994).
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markup over marginal cost (known as the price-cost margin or Lerner
Index) equals the HHI divided by the elasticity of demand. In the
Cournot model, the HHI represents the sum of the squared market
shares, rather than market capacities. In symbols:
p - mc
HHI
P
where E is the market elasticity of demand, mc is marginal cost, and p is
the market price. This formula justifies the use of the HHI in assessing
market power by suggesting that larger HHIs will, other things being
equal, lead to higher prices.
In market power studies, the HHI is used primarily as a
screening device. Low values of the HI suggest that prices are unlikely
to exceed competitive levels because the ability of one or few firms to
control supply and exercise market power is so limited. As a matter of
general principle, it is more difficult to predict with certainty the effect
on prices when the HHI takes on high values. While a high level of
concentration within a market may be a necessary condition for the
successful exercise of market power by one or few suppliers, it is by no
means a sufficient condition. For instance, some markets served by just
two or three firms have been found to be intensely competitive, while
others with three or more firms have been found not to be competitive.
For example, the market for soft drinks is characterized by intense
competition between the two major competitors - Coca Cola and
Pepsico. Therefore, for markets characterized by high values for the HHIL,
other factors-such as ease of entry, buyer power, and elasticity of
demand - must be considered.

In evaluating a firm's ability to exercise market power, it is also
important to take into account the likely supply responses of rival
suppliers to an anticompetitive price increase, since the profitability of a
given firm's unilateral price increase depends in large part on the supply
responses of rival suppliers. In particular, if those rival suppliers have
excess capacity that they will supply in response to a given price
increase, the profitability of the price increase declines. In such a case, a
high HHI would tend to overstate the likelihood of market power.
Rather than being a dispositive finding regarding market power, a high
HHI value basically represents a flag that further inquiry is required to
determine the presence or extent of market power. More direct studies of
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market performance are then generally conducted to determine
competitiveness on a case-by-case basis. 88
As noted above, the HHI is best considered as a screening device
to determine when and if additional scrutiny of possible market power is
warranted. This naturally raises the question: At what level of the HHI is
such additional scrutiny to be triggered? That is, what value is
considered a "high" level of market concentration?
Both the FERC and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) have set
HHI criteria for evaluating market power. In assessing the market power
of pipelines, the Commission has established an FHI-I of 1800 as its
threshold screening device.8 9 To put this in perspective, consider that an
HHI of approximately 1800 would result from a market in which there
were, for example, five to six firms of roughly equal share. According to
the Policy Statement, applications for market-based rates will receive
"closer scrutiny" when concentration is determined to be in excess of this
level. 90 Note, however, that an HHI value exceeding 1800 does not rule
out eligibility for market-based rates under this standard. Neither the
FERC nor any other agency has applied a bright-line test in which a
finding of 1800 (or any other particular level of the HHI) automatically
precludes authority for market-based rates. The DOJ, for example, also
makes use of the HHI statistic in assessing market power but has
concluded in its assessment of the oil pipeline industry that markets
exhibiting HHIs below 2500 require no further scrutiny and should be
deregulated. 91 An HHI of 2500 corresponds to a market with four equal92
sized firms. The DOJ, in its 1986 report on oil pipeline deregulation,
maintained that competition among four equal-sized, deregulated firms
in any origin or destination market was likely to be more efficient than
regulation since cost-of-service regulation imposes significant direct and
indirect costs.

93

Thus, there is nothing sacrosanct about the FERC's use of 1800 as
its threshold level of market concentration. Indeed, the Commission has
88.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 3,

(last
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz-book/hmgl.html
visited Aug. 25, 2004).
89. Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 61,235.
90. Id.
91. In the face of the impossibility of actually measuring the costs of regulation, the
DOJ believes that an HHI of 2500 is a reasonable threshold above which pipelines should
be presumed to require continued regulation. ANTITRUST DW., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OIL
PIPELINE DEREGULATION:

REPORT OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 29-30

(1986)

(footnote omitted), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/foia/foiaroom.htm.
92. Id.
93. Comments of the U.S. Dep't of Justice in Response to Notice of Technical
Conference, F.E.R.C., at 5-6 (July 30,1992) (No. OR92-6-000).
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explicitly stated as much: "The Commission will not adopt a rigid
brightline threshold level for the HHI, below which an applicant would
automatically qualify for market-based rates, oi above which an
applicant would be excluded from market-based rates." 94 For example,
as explained in its 1996 Policy Statement, the Commission has opted to
use a higher HHI of 2500 as an initial screen in oil pipeline cases. 95 In
practice, these structural considerations have resulted in cases in which
the Commission has approved market-based rates even when the HHI
exceeded the 1800 screen. In its Buckeye decision, for example, the
Commission did not rule out markets with HHIs well in excess of 1800 as
eligible for market-based rates; rather, the Commission applied "closer
scrutiny" to those geographic markets and concluded that some should
nonetheless be allowed to have market-based rates.96
D. Evaluation of Other Relevant Factors
The Policy Statement notes that a seller can exercise market
power either by unilaterally raising its price or by acting in concert with
other firms. 97 In the first scenario, a firm must generally have a large
market share to exercise market power successfully. Accordingly, an
applicant for market-based rates must submit calculations to the FERC of
its market share in all relevant origin, destination, and "path" markets.
Large market share, however, is merely one condition for the exercise of
market power, as other economic factors could offset a firm's unilateral
pricing power. In addition to reporting structural factors such as market
shares and market concentration, an applicant should, whenever
possible, examine actual market performance. As discussed in section
IV.C, market performance studies can provide direct evidence of the
competitiveness of markets.
As the Policy Statement recognizes, one economic factor that can
offset market power resulting from a high concentration of sellers is
concentration among buyers. 98 The presence of buyer concentration,
however, is not adequately accounted for in an HHI-based evaluation.
Accordingly, we describe the economic principles relevant to evaluating
the effect of buyer concentration on market power. Specifically, we show
how to calculate the amount by which buyer power reduces transportation rates, by compensating for the implicit and often mistaken
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 61,235 (footnote omitted).
Id.
See Opinion No. 360, Buckeye Pipe Line Company L.P., 53 F.E.R.C. 61,473 (1990).
Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 61,234-35.
Id. at 61,235.
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assumption in HII-based rate calculations that buyers are unconcentrated and thus cannot offset the effects of seller concentration.
Another factor that must be considered in an evaluation of
market power is, as the Commission notes, the excess capacity held by
sellers.99 A seller will tend to have a greater or lesser degree of success
exercising market power depending on the excess capacity of its rivals.
We describe the appropriate economic framework suitable for the
natural gas industry and others for determining how much excess
capacity a firm's rivals would have to have before a firm would be
1°°
unable to profitably increase prices.
As noted above, market performance studies provide direct
0
evidence of the competitiveness of markets.' ' In the context of FERCregulated pipelines, a direct test of a firm's ability to exercise market
power over a given service can be obtained by (1) determining if the firm
sells all its capacity of that service and (2) comparing its billed rates to its
maximum legal rates. Firms with market power withhold capacity in
order to obtain prices in excess of cost. Thus, if a firm sells all its
capacity, it cannot be exercising market power. If the firm sells all its
capacity at prices below maximum regulated levels, this finding is
reinforced.
Finally, the Commission has established that an applicant for
market-based rates may identify conditions or changes that it could
implement in order to mitigate concerns regarding the level and effects
of its market power. 10 2 Thus, if a firm is aware that it will be unable, on
the basis of its own analysis, to show it lacks market power, it may
to its service; these are
propose mitigating conditions or adjustments
10 3
Commission.
the
by
then evaluated

99. Id.
100. See infra Part IV.C.3.
101. See infra Part W.C.
102. Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 61,235.
103. Id. at 61,236-42. The Policy Statement further declares that in cases where marketbased rates are not a viable option, regulation will continue on the basis of cost-based rates,
including the option to apply for incentive rates. As another alternative, for pipelines that
do not attempt to establish their lack of market power and do not desire to pursue an
incentive rate program, the Policy Statement outlines a possible recourse rate policy. Under
such a program, firms could negotiate rates and terms with each individual shipper to
provide flexibility, but shippers would retain the option to revert to cost-based service, if
necessary. The recourse service option would restrain pipelines from exercising market
power, while allowing some of the gains of more flexible pricing.
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1. Actual and PotentialEntry as an Offset to Seller Power
Ease of entry into a market can ensure that price increases will
not be profitable to incumbents, thereby restraining their attempt to
exercise market power. In the case of natural gas transportation, entry
may be facilitated by potential pipeline expansions that do not require
substantial sunk costs (i.e., costs that cannot be recovered). The
Commission allows for evaluation of actual and potential entry as part of
a market power assessment, noting that if entry into the relevant market
is sufficiently easy, then even a pipeline possessing a large market share
or competing in a concentrated market may not be able to exercise
market power.104 Of course, ease of entry influences the number and
availability of good alternatives to a given pipeline's service, the
determination of which is central to the Commission's assessment of
market power.
2. Buyer Power as an Offset to Seller Power
The Commission specifically suggests that, in some cases, a large
sophisticated buyer may be able to "negotiate reasonable rates even in a
concentrated market." 105 Buyer power, also known as "monopsony
power," 1° 6 is the analogue to monopoly power in the case of sellers.
Monopsony power results when buyers have the ability to withhold
demand from the market, thereby lowering prices below levels that
would have been observed in its absence. It is a countervailing force to
seller power and is thus relevant to an assessment of the market power
potentially exercisable by a supplier, since sellers do not have the
unilateral ability to raise prices above competitive levels in the face of
significant buyer power. The FERC recognized as much in its 1996 Policy
Statement, specifically discussing buyer power as one of the competitive
factors potentially limiting or preventing the exercise of market power
by an applicant. 107 Indeed, the Commission explicitly recommends that
applicants analyze the role of buyers in the relevant gas transportation
markets when assessing the presence or absence of market power.108
After all, any market power study that ignores the role of buyer power
runs the danger of generating incorrect findings. Thus, the presence of

104.
105.

Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 61,235.
Id.

106.

ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMIcs 358 (5th ed. 2000).

107.
108.

Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 61,235.
Id.
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buyer power 1° 9 can alleviate some or all of the anticompetitive effects of
concentrated seller power.110
Figure One illustrates how buyer power alleviates some or all of
the anticompetitive effects of seller power. In the Figure, market supply
is shown by the curve S1 and market demand by the curve Di. These
supply and demand curves cross at point A, which represents the
equilibrium when neither buyers nor sellers exercise market power.
Sellers exercise market power by withholding capacity from the market,
which is illustrated in Figure One by a shift in the supply curve from S1
to S 2. All else being equal, the market equilibrium changes from point A
to point B, reflecting a higher price and a lower quantity.
Buyers exercise market power by withholding demand from the
market. This is illustrated by a shift in the demand curve from D, to D 2.
If all else is equal, the market equilibrium changes from point B to point
C as the shifting demand curve forces the point of equilibrium to travel
downward and leftward along the new supply curve. As Figure One is
constructed, buyer power exactly offsets seller power, such that the
109. In this context, buyer power is interpreted to be the ability of buyers (all else being
equal) to lower market prices.
110. The issue of buyer power has also been confronted in case law. For example, in
United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 731 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1990), affd, 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir.
1990), the United States sought to enjoin a merger between a subsidiary of Baker Hughes
and a subsidiary of Oy Tampella AB, both manufacturers of hardrock hydraulic
underground drilling rigs (HHUDR) on the grounds that the merger would substantially
lessen competition. The United States presented HHIs showing that merger would increase
concentration in an already highly concentrated market. In rejecting the government's
request for an injunction, the district court noted that the sophistication of the buyers of
HHUDRs was likely to promote competition even in a highly concentrated market. The
district court's decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981. Similarly, in United States v. Calmar Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1298
(D.N.J. 1985), the United States sought to enjoin a merger between Calmar, which
controlled 60 percent of the product market of "regular sprayers" and 58 percent of the
product market of "regular dispensers," and Realex, which controlled 23 percent and 21
percent of the markets for regular sprayers and regular dispensers, respectively. The
complaint alleged that the regular sprayer market, even prior to the merger, was highly
concentrated, containing just three participants and exhibiting an HHI of approximately
4400; the regular dispenser market had but five participants ex ante, which yielded an HHI
of approximately 4000. The proposed merger between the firms was expected to create ex
post HHIs of more than 7100 and 6400 in the two markets. Notwithstanding these
relatively high HHI statistics, the court denied the application for a preliminary injunction
barring the merger, citing such non-quantitative factors as the ease of entry into each
product market as mitigating elements. Interestingly, the court also intimated that buyer
power-in particular, the ability of buyers to manufacture the pump dispensers
themselves -existed to ameliorate some of the concerns regarding supplier concentration.
Without assigning a value to buyer power to use in conjunction with the traditional HHI
model, the court nonetheless took note of its existence in and potential relevance to the
product markets while at issue. Calmar,612 F. Supp. at 1298-1307.
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equilibrium price is the same at C as it was at A, albeit with a lower
quantity. More generally, buyer power may only partially offset seller
power, in which case the final price would be between points A and B. It
is possible, however, for buyer power in certain instances to more than
offset seller power, in which case the final price would be below point A.
Figure One: The Effects of Buyer Power on Seller Power

Price

Quantity
Shippers can acquire buyer power through the accumulation of
capacity rights. For example, shippers vertically integrate upstream into
the market for transportation services when they enter into long-term
firm transportation contracts. By acquiring these contracts, shippers
become owners of contractual rights to firm transportation services,
which they can either sell in the capacity release market or use to supply
their own demands for transportation services. If they choose the latter
course, they become both a seller and a buyer of transportation services,
i.e., they are vertically integrated. In this circumstance, purchases the
firm makes from itself are not subjected to the exercise of market power.
Thus, all other factors being the same, the more a buyer vertically
integrates upstream into the market for transportation services, the less
its purchases of those services are subjected to market power.
Buyer power is thus another factor that can weigh against an
applicant's ability to exercise market power. If a shipper has large
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enough market share, or if the market for a pipeline's service is
sufficiently concentrated, then buyers may be able to negotiate
reasonable rates, despite a seller's market power. We caution the reader
that HHI values generated for the purpose of assessing the market
power of a supplier of natural gas seeking market based rates are likely
to overstate the presence of such power, since the HHI is a measure of
supplier concentration only and thus does not take into account possible
buyer power.
IV. CRITIQUE OF FERC'S MARKET POWER ASSESSMENT
METHODOLOGY
The Commission's methods for evaluating proposals by natural
gas transporters for market-based rates fail to address several issues
critical to the accurate assessment of an applicant's ability to gain and
exercise market power. As discussed above, the FERC relies on the wellknown Herfindahl-Hirschman Index' as a measure of the concentration
of sellers in a market, and it uses threshold values of the index as a
112
regulatory screen when evaluating a market's "competitiveness." If the
HHI is sufficiently small, the Commission concludes that enough service
11 3
providers exist that market power could not be profitably exercised.
The FERC evaluates the HHI for each origin, destination, and "path"
market according to data from each mainline receipt point in an origin
market and from each delivery point in a destination market. Only the
classified as good alternatives are
sales or capacity figures of pipelines
114
calculations.
HHI
included in the
As we explain below, however, the HHI structural approach has
significant limitations and is generally considered inferior to a direct,
performance-based analysis of market power when such an analysis is
feasible. Additionally, the Commission's various definitions of relevant
geographic or product markets fail to capture the good alternatives
available to a given pipeline's services. This undermines the usefulness
of the Commission's estimated H-H, since correct identification of
alternatives is a prerequisite to determining market shares appropriately.
As noted above, one of our main purposes in this article is to present
new tools that can assist in market power analysis. As we discuss the
shortcomings inherent in the Commission's current methodology for

111.
112.
113.
114.

See supra Part III.C.
Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 61,234-35.

Id.
See supra Part III.A.
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assessing market power, we also provide suggestions for overcoming
those limitations.
A. Origin-Destination "Paths" Are Not Relevant Geographic Markets
As noted above, the Commission has suggested that origindestination paths can be considered relevant geographic markets for
antitrust analysis. We believe, however, that path markets no longer
describe the good alternatives available to shippers and, thus, do not
constitute relevant antitrust markets. As a result of the Commission's
open access policies, the gas industry has become highly integrated and
has continued to evolve in ways that eliminate origin-destination paths
as relevant geographic markets.1 1 5 Specifically, FERC's open-access
policies have greatly expanded the alternatives available to shippers.
These alternatives are not reflected in the specification of path markets,
which diminishes the usefulness of path markets as a tool for the
assessment of market power. As Michaels and DeVany observed in 1995:
The past decade's expansion of interconnections and
trading institutions has so increased competition that the
markets the FERC believes are relevant are the ones that its
policy has rendered irrelevant. Origin-destination analysis
describes opportunities in a balkanized, weakly connected
pipeline network that no longer exists. 1 6
Indeed, since the Commission's Policy Statement was prepared
in 1996, markets have become more highly integrated, new trading
institutions have developed, market hubs and storage options have
increased in numbers, and capacity release programs have flourished." 7
Path markets do not reflect these characteristics of the industry and thus
fail to describe accurately the good alternatives available to shippers.
Furthermore, paths cannot appropriately be considered relevant
geographic markets because a hypothetical monopolist of gas
transportation services on an origin-destination pair cannot profitably
raise prices above competitive levels for a significant period of time.
Consequently, such origin-destination paths are of no relevance in
conducting a market power study of gas transportation providers.
Above, we discussed how the highly integrated nature of the
natural gas industry affects the nature of the good alternatives available
115. See, e.g., Doane & Spulber, supra note 33.
116. Robert J. Michaels & Arthur DeVany, Market-Based Rates for Interstate Gas Pipelines:
The Relevant Market and the Real Market, 16 ENERGY L.J. 320 (1995).
117. EIA 1998, supra note 27.
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to transportation buyers. We now show that protecting pipeline buyers
of transportation services (i.e., buyers and sellers of natural gas) from the
exercise of market power by sellers does not require that pipelines serve
the same route or path. Sellers of natural gas, for instance, are protected
from the exercise of market power when they have sufficient alternatives
to transportation- that is, when there are other pipelines serving the
seller. Protection may require the seller to build a line to another pipeline
to create a new, more competitive choice, but it is not necessary that the
pipeline go to any particular buyer. Note also that the cost of such a line
is relevant, since the option to build a long, expensive spur provides
relatively less protection than does the possibility of building a short,
inexpensive spur. Furthermore, competing pipelines need not serve the
same destination market to protect sellers of natural gas. The concern of
natural gas sellers is to obtain "high" prices for their gas, and they
typically do not care about the destination of the gas except as the
destination affects the netback price their gas commands.
Similarly, a buyer of natural gas is protected from the exercise of
market power by any one pipeline when there are so many alternative
transportation providers bringing natural gas to the buyer that no one
provider can increase transportation prices profitably. If there are
substitutes permitting the buyer to obtain gas from other regions, for
example, a price increase by one pipeline will prompt buyers to
substitute with gas from other pipelines. If such substitution renders the
price increase unprofitable, any attempt to increase prices thus causes
the pipeline to lose revenue, and the buyer is protected from the exercise
of market power. Since buyers of gas can substitute with gas from other
regions, buyers need only alternative pipelines. The pipeline need not
come from a particular seller.
Therefore, routes or paths between particular buyers and sellers
of natural gas are of no relevance in conducting a market power study of
gas transportation providers. Indeed, the highly integrated nature of the
gas industry makes the notion of origin-destination pairs of geographic
areas inappropriate as a description of the market environment. Buyers
generally have a number of alternative paths over which to obtain gas.
Buyers fundamentally care about delivered gas prices and do not focus
on (indeed, often do not even know) the geographical source of supply.
Therefore, a market power study should not analyze the routes or paths
between particular buyers and sellers of natural gas, but should instead
reflect the substitution possibilities of buyers and sellers.
In sum, the highly integrated nature of natural gas transportation markets means that a hypothetical monopolist of gas
transportation services on an origin-destination pair of geographic areas
cannot profitably raise prices above competitive levels for a significant
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period of time. If such an attempt were made, originating shippers
would substitute to transportation services to other destinations, and
destination shippers would substitute to transportation services from
other origins. Therefore, origin-destination pairs cannot constitute
relevant antitrust geographic markets because market power cannot be
exercised in those geographic areas. The scale economies associated with
the construction of natural gas pipelines exist for an individual pipeline
connecting a single origin region with a single destination region, but
scale economies do not preclude different firms from operating different
pipelines within relevant antitrust markets. For example, different
pipelines are required to move gas from the Permian Basin into the
Chicago area and from Canada into the Chicago area. No cost savings
result from having the same firm own these separate pipelines. Similarly,
different pipelines transport gas from the Permian Basin to Chicago and
from the Permian Basin to California. There is no reason why the
pipeline taking gas from the Permian Basin to Chicago and the pipeline
taking gas from the Permian Basin to California must be owned by the
same firm.
In order to ensure sufficient competition among transportation
providers (and thus to protect buyers and sellers of natural gas from the
exercise of market power), it is not necessary that alternate pipelines
serve the same route or path. As noted above, buyers of gas can
substitute to gas from other regions; what is necessary to protect buyers
is that alternative pipelines are available. Similarly, sellers are protected
if there are other pipelines serving the seller; it is not necessary that these
go to any particular buyer. This concept is illustrated in Figure Two,
which presents a pipeline that has a monopoly on a path from seller S1
to buyer B1 but is nevertheless prevented from exercising market power
by the presence of competing alternatives. Any increase in the price of
transportation on the route S1 to B1 will send the seller to alternate
buyers, will send the buyer to alternate sellers, or both. Neither party is
willing to absorb the price increase, which means that the pipeline loses
market share, rendering the price increase unprofitable. Indeed, as a
practical matter, it is not necessary that the alternate pipelines currently
exist, provided they can be built sufficiently quickly and cheaply.
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Figure Two: Inadequacy of Paths as a Definition of the Relevant
Market
B5

B4

B3
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S2
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Figure One: Seller S1 and Buyer B1 are connected by a single pipeline. However, that
pipeline has no ability to exercise market power, because both seller S1 and buyer BI
have four alternative sources to sell or buy natural gas.

Path-defined geographic markets may be appropriate in cases
travel, where customers care about both their origins and
airline
like
destinations (for example, air travel from San Francisco to Washington,
D.C. is not a substitute for air travel from Houston to Washington, D.C.,
although they have the same destinations), but they are not applicable to
the natural gas industry. Buyers of natural gas care only about delivered
prices and are indifferent to the source, so long as gas from different
regions is equivalent in quality. Similarly, sellers are concerned with
netback prices and are indifferent to the location of the buyer offering the
netback. These conditions hold because prices in an integrated market
are approximately equal net of transportation costs. Since buyers and
sellers of natural gas-the purchasers of transportation service-in
essence care only about one end of the transaction, markets defined as
paths between specific pairs of receipt and delivery areas are irrelevant
to a market power study in natural gas transportation. While the FERC
has suggested that customers could care about the particular path over
which gas travels as a result of specific contractual obligations, such
concerns are unlikely to be observed in practice. Delivered gas prices,
e.g., to a particular city gate, are the same regardless of the geographic
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source of the gas. This reflects the integration of wellhead markets for
natural gas.118 Gas markets have achieved a high degree of liquidity,
such that a shipper can generally find ready buyers and sellers with
whom to trade in the event that it wishes to change its receipt and
delivery locations. And as discussed above, the recent development of
market centers further facilitates such trades and exchanges.
B. "Peak-Day" Demand Periods Are Not Relevant Product Markets
Peak-day demand periods do not constitute a relevant product
market for purposes of evaluating market power for two reasons. First,
peak-day periods are transitory and therefore cannot be a basis for the
determination of market power. By definition, market power is the
ability to maintain prices above competitive levels profitably for a
significant period of time.119 Peak-day demand periods, on the other
hand, are inherently transient and thus cannot be considered a relevant
product market. While the Commission cautioned in its Koch decision 20
that a transportation provider might be able to exercise market power
during a peak period, temporary pricing should not be the focus of a
market power evaluation.
The second reason is that defining peak-day periods as a
separate product market fails to consider consumers' alternatives to
peak-day prices that are available prior to the peak-day period.
Emphasizing peak-day transactions in a market power evaluation
overlooks the fact that buyers, such as local distribution company (LDC)
shippers, often plan their transport service purchases well in advance;
those who do not (e.g., gas marketers) tacitly accept the risk of higher
peak-day prices. Prior to the peak-day period, consumers have a number
of alternatives through which they can secure, in advance, prices for gas
transportation that are lower than those that prevail as a result of
heightened demand during the peak-day period. To begin with,
consumers of pipeline capacity have the option to enter into long-term
contracts that offer protection from the price fluctuations of peak
demand periods. Next, buyers can acquire transportation services on a
short-term basis (e.g., intramonth, one-month, or three-month contracts)
if they anticipate their advance reservation of transport capacity will be
insufficient to meet demand. Similarly, buyers can purchase delivered
118. Doane & Spulber, supra note 33, at 513; DeVany & Walls, supranote 31, at 555.
119. FERC Request for Comments on Alternative Pricing Methods, Alternatives to
Traditional Cost-of-Service Ratemaking for Natural Gas Pipelines, 70 F.E.R.C. 61,139 at
61,230 (1995).
120. Koch Gateway Order, supra note 12.
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121
supplies on the "gray market" on a short-term basis. And, as discussed
above, buyers also have the opportunity to acquire transportation rights
held by other shippers through capacity release arrangements.
Peoples Energy, the parent company of Peoples Gas and North
Shore Gas, which serves the Chicago area, is representative of a local
distribution company taking actions to avoid the possibility of hold-up
on peak days. According to a recent Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) Form 10-K 122 for the firm:

Peoples Gas and North Shore Gas have each entered into
various long-term and short-term firm gas supply
contracts. When used in conjunction with contract peaking
and contract storage, Peoples Gas' company-owned
storage, and the peak-shaving facilities of the utilities, such
supply is deemed sufficient to meet current and foreseeable
peak and annual market requirements. 123
In a similar manner, Puget Sound Energy (PSE), which serves
approximately 622,000 customers in Washington State, primarily in the
areas surrounding Seattle and Olympia, 124 also effectively mitigates the
risk of shortages on peak days. PSE accommodates its peak demand
requirements in part by managing "a blended portfolio of long-term
firm, short-term firm and non-firm gas supplies from a diverse group of
major and independent producers and gas marketers in the United States
and Canada." 125 This portfolio, with its "geographic mix of suppliers and
daily, monthly and annual take requirements," is structured to capitalize
on regional price differentials as they arise, providing to PSE "a high
degree of flexibility in managing gas supplies during off-peak periods to
minimize costs." 126 During such off-peak periods, PSE thus arranges for
121. The "gray market" is the practice of gas marketers and other shippers, including
LDCs, of selling bundled gas and gas transportation service during peak periods.
122. A 10-K is an annual report providing a comprehensive view of a company's
business, which is required yearly by the SEC. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78(a).
123. Peoples Energy Corp., Form 10-K, at 10 (Dec. 14, 2001) (for Fiscal Year ended Sept.
31, 2001).
124. Puget Energy, Inc., Form 10-K, pt. 1.1 (Business) (Mar. 10, 2003) (for Fiscal Year
ended Dec. 31, 2002) [hereinafter Puget Energy 2002 10-K].
125. Id. In 1998, for example, PSE took assignment of a third-party peaking gas supply
service contract, which now allows PSE to divert away up to 48,000 Dekatherms
9
(approximately 48x10 MMBtu) per day of gas it supplies to the Tenaska Cogeneration
Facility. Specifically, PSE can cause the facility to operate on distillate fuel (paying any
additional costs of such operation to Tenaska) in exchange for the ability to divert the
natural gas to PSE's core gas load. Id.
126. Puget Energy 2002 10-K, supra note 124, pt. 1.1 (Gas Supply).
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the purchase and storage of natural gas that can be freed later to meet
peak demand. As the parent company of the utility explained in its Form
10-K filing for 2002:
For baseload and peak-shaving purposes, PSE supplements
its firm gas supply portfolio by purchasing natural gas at
generally lower prices in months of low market demand for
gas, injecting it into underground storage facilities and
withdrawing it during the winter heating season. Storage
facilities at Jackson Prairie in Western Washington and at
Clay Basin in Utah are used for this purpose. Peaking needs
are also met by using PSE owned gas held in NPC's
liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility at Plymouth,
Washington, and by producing propane-air gas at a plant
127
owned by PSE and located on its distribution system.
According to the firm's 10-K, all peak firm gas supplies and storage are
connected to PSE's markets via firm transportation capacity.28 Finally,
PSE notes also that it "enters into short-term physical and financial derivative instruments to hedge the cost of gas to service its customers." 129
As the firm asserts in its 2002 10-K filing, "PSE expects to meet
its firm peak-day requirements for residential, commercial and industrial
markets through its firm gas purchase contracts, firm transportation
capacity, firm storage capacity and other firm peaking resources."1 30 As a
consequence, PSE concludes that it can acquire incremental firm gas
supplies to meet anticipated demand increases by its firm customers.131
Boston Gas provides a final example of a local distribution
company taking actions to avoid the possibility of hold-up on peak days.
Boston Gas had peak day firm throughput (in Bcf) of 0.86 in 2002, 0.63 in
2001, and 0.80 in 2000.132 In order to meet these demands, Boston Gas
provides for "peak period demand through a least-cost portfolio of
pipeline, storage and supplemental supplies," which it explains thusly:
Supplemental supplies include LNG and propane air,
which are vaporized mainly at points on our distribution
system. We own propane air facilities and one LNG facility
in Dorchester, Massachusetts. We also lease two LNG
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Boston Gas Company d/b/a KeySpan Energy Delivery New England, Form 10K/A, at 4 (Aug. 16, 2003) (for Fiscal Year ended Dec. 31, 2002).
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facilities sited on land owned by us in Salem and Lynn,
Massachusetts and also lease space in facilities located in
33
Providence, Rhode Island and Everett, Massachusetts
Boston Gas has also contracted with pipeline companies and
others for the storage of additional natural gas in underground fields in
Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia; according to the
firm, these contracts collectively provide storage capacity of 16.3 Bcf and
peak-day deliverability of 0.18 Bcf.134 Boston Gas utilizes existing
contracts for transportation of gas from storage fields to service
territories. Their supplemental supplies of both liquefied natural gas and35
propane are purchased from both foreign and domestic producers
Boston Gas has determined that its peak-day capacity adequately meets
the demands of its firm customers.1 36 The extent to which companies
have developed plans for avoiding peak day shortages reflects the notion
that these periods should not be the focus of a market power evaluation.
Buyers of gas transportation services can also avoid or otherwise
mitigate peak-day price increases through management of their own gas
purchases and reserves. In anticipation of periods of higher demand, for
instance, buyers can store natural gas at their own facilities or through
the services of third-party storage providers. Unlike electricity, which
cannot be stored, natural gas affords purchasers the option of creating
and maintaining gas reserves that can be tapped as needed to mitigate
the effects of peak-day transportation prices. In addition, LDCs and
other such large buyers of transportation services can take steps to
reduce their own demand during peak periods. Such steps might include
negotiating terms with customers that allow for the interruption of
service during peak demand periods, implementing conservation
programs, or using alternate fuels.
Given the presence of such alternatives, firm transport services
on peak days should not be considered a distinct relevant product
market. Additional support for this position comes from the recent
development of futures markets in natural gas, which also helps alleviate
the effects of peak-day demand increases. 137 By allowing the trading not
only of contracts for natural gas delivery but also of physical deliveries
(including swaps) themselves, futures markets work to hedge against the
risk of a sudden change in transportation price or availability.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4.
DeVany & Walls, supra note 31.
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As the Commission concluded in Order No. 637, the high prices
of peak periods primarily reflect rents due to transitory demand
conditions, not the exercise of market power. 138 It is demand in excess of
capacity - rather than the exercise of market power - that explains the
increased cost of transportation on peak days.139 Indeed, firm behavior
observed during peak demand periods is generally consistent with the
ordinary operation of a competitive market and inconsistent with the
supposed exercise of market power. In order to take advantage of market
power to increase prices, after all, a firm must withhold capacity. During
peak periods, however, pipelines tend to sell all of their capacity, and
many pipelines are unable to withhold capacity because all or most of
their capacity is already under contract. In fact, peak demand is such that
transportation firms would prefer not to restrict capacity, as these
periods provide a profitable opportunity to earn a return on their
investment in pipelines. Such a situation is to be expected in a
competitive industry; peak-period pricing is actually necessary if firms
are to recover the fixed costs of infrastructure. 40 The capacity constraints
of peak-day periods, therefore, are important to maintain competition
and to allow efficient firms to recover total costs. Conversely, if the
market rate during peak periods is artificially constrained by a price cap,
inefficiencies may result, since the imposition of maximum rates can
prevent the allocation of capacity to those who value it most. In the
absence of a cap, prices are more likely to reflect the actual cost of the
service being provided and will accordingly provide a more accurate
signal of entry conditions and the underlying costs of transportation.
Finally, we note that the issue raised by "high" prices during
peak periods is essentially an equity or distributional issue-i.e., which
party will receive the short-term economic rents resulting from peak
demands. In the absence of market-based rates, these rents currently
138. FERC Order No. 637, 65 Fed. Reg. at 10,162-63.
139. There is also evidence to suggest that the transportation component represents a
small portion of the final delivered price of gas to residential users and that there is
virtually no correlation between the monthly delivered gas prices and the monthly value of
transportation. According to the EIA, in August 2004, the wellhead price of natural gas
was, on average, approximately 83 percent of the price of natural gas at the city gate. Thus,
transportation accounted for less than 20 percent of the price of natural gas at the city gate.
See
Energy
Info.
Admin.,
U.S.
Natural
Gas
Prices,
at
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/ng-pri-sum -dcu-nus-m.htm (last updated Oct. 29,
2004). These findings support the hypothesis that, although the monthly price of
transportation may increase in peak periods as demand and supply conditions change,
only a small portion of the gas actually flows at the high transportation price. One can then
conclude that the effect of the increase in transportation rates on delivered gas prices is
likely to be negligible.
140. John Panzer, A Neoclassical Approach to Peak Load Pricing,7 BELL J.ECON. 521 (1976).
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accrue to arbitrageurs and other participants in the gray market who sell
packaged gas and transportation services to LDCs, implicitly charging
high prices for the transportation of natural gas.' 4 ' In the presence of
market-based rates, some of these rents may accrue to the pipeline
instead of the arbitrageurs, but the very ability of the pipeline to compete
with arbitrageurs in this manner serves as an additional competitive
force. Even assuming, arguendo, that a pipeline could charge
transportation rates during peak periods that exceed current maximum
legal levels, such activity would not constitute the exercise of market
power because it would mainly represent a redistribution of economic
rents from gray-market sellers to the pipeline itself. End users would not
pay prices that were higher than otherwise. In other words, the presence
of an additional seller of transportation at prices not limited by a cap will
not cause prices to rise. Indeed, the pipeline's entry into that business
would provide additional competition to existing gray-market sellers.
Accordingly, that presence would reduce transportation rates during
peak periods.
C. Structural Analyses and the Role of the HHI
When the necessary information exists to implement a direct,
performance-based analysis of market power, that approach is preferred
to an indirect, structural method such as the use of the HHI to infer
possible market power from supplier concentration. 142 While the
structural method may be used as a screening device, it is the market
performance data that provide direct evidence of market competitiveness (or lack thereof). For example, if the HHI concentration level in a
market exceeds the DOJ screen of 2500 for oil pipelines, it does not
necessarily imply that firms have significant market power. Rather, the
structural screen suggests that an additional analysis of performance
data is required in order to determine whether or not firms have market
143
power.
141. As explained by the Commission, the "fact that the value of transportation in the
short-term bundled sales market exceeds the daily or monthly maximum rate now
permitted in pipeline tariffs is not surprising, nor is it evidence that market power is being
exercised." FERC Order No. 637, 65 Fed. Reg. at 10,180 (emphasis added).
142. FTC v. BP Amoco, No. C-3938 (filed Apr. 13, 2000), availableat http://www.ftc.gov
/os/2000/04/bparcocomplaint.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2004); FTC v. Staples, No. 1:97CV
00701 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 10, 1997), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1997/04/pubbrief.
pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2004).
143. Thus, for example, in its analysis of the proposed merger of BP Amoco with the
Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) explicitly
adopted a direct, performance-based approach. See FTC Complaint, at http://www.ftc.
gov/os/2000/04/bparcocomplaint.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2004).
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Market performance studies examine firms' prices and the extent
to which those prices exceed levels that would be observed in a
competitive market. In the context of FERC-regulated pipelines, a firm's
ability to exercise market power over a given service can be evaluated by
(1) determining if the firm sells all its capacity of that service and (2)
comparing its billed rates to its maximum legal rates. Firms with market
power withhold capacity in order to obtain prices in excess of cost. If the
presence of a regulation establishes maximum legal rates that a pipeline
can charge, thereby constraining the ability of the firm to charge prices
beyond a certain ceiling, one would expect that a firm with market
power would bill at a rate equal to its maximum allowable rates under
the regulation. Thus, if a firm sells all its capacity, it cannot be exercising
market power. If the firm sells all its capacity at prices below maximum
regulated levels, this finding is reinforced.
Such direct tests of the exercise of market power are to be
preferred over the indirect inferences of an HHI-based analysis. 144
However, as discussed above, the HHI is useful as an initial screen, since
low degrees of market concentration are often sufficient to demonstrate a
lack of market power. There is, thus, a place for the HHI in the
Commission's assessment of proposals for market-based rates, but we
identify a number of issues that should be addressed if the HHI is to
perform its role effectively.
1. Elasticity of Demand
As discussed above, the HHI by itself is a poor measure of
market power. Instead, a more appropriate measure of how much
market power is being exercised is given by the degree to which price is
marked up over the competitive pricing level of marginal cost. In the
Cournot model, this mark-up equals the HHI divided by the market
elasticity of demand. 145 Thus, when market demand is fairly inelastic, the
HHI may be a good measure of market power in the absence of buyer
power. In contrast, when market demand is elastic, even a very
concentrated industry has little ability to influence the price, and the
threat of market power is minimal. Note that, in the current context, the
relevant market demand elasticity is the demand for gas transportation
146
(i.e., pipeline capacity)- not the demand for delivered gas.
144.
145.

See cases cited supra note 142.
For a discussion of the Cournot model, see, e.g., JEFFREY CHURCH & ROGER WARE,
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: A STRATEGIC APPROACH 233 (2000).
146. In addition to the market demand elasticity, we can also define the elasticity of
demand facing an individual company. The market demand elasticity measures the
percentage of change in the total quantity of sales to all buyers in response to a price
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2. ProperMeasurement of Market Shares
With respect to market concentration, the recent developments
in the gas industry discussed at the outset of this article imply that the
economically meaningful measure of market share is one based on
relative capacities of shippers' FT service capacity rights, and not on the
number of pipelines connected to individual shippers. Additionally, the
presence of an integrated network and the availability of capacity release
further alleviate concerns regarding undue discrimination as expressed
in the FERC's Policy Statement. To discriminate profitably, a pipeline
must charge prices to its customers in accord with their elasticities of
demand in order to charge higher prices to those with greater
willingness to pay. However, the pipeline must also keep these
customers separated or otherwise prevent resale among them. With open
access, a pipeline cannot prevent such arbitrage because, if there is a
disparity between price and cost among customers, capacity release
facilitates the use of arbitrage that tends to eliminate those differences.
Our analysis, thus, leads to the conclusion that recent market
developments have tended to make irrelevant HHIs for which shares are
determined based on the number of pipelines connected to individual
shippers. Economically, an HHI based on the number of pipelines is not
relevant to competitive outcomes under open access because the
ownership of firm transportation rights gives shippers multiple buying
options within a single pipe. Instead of acquiring transportation only
from the pipeline, shippers can acquire transportation capacity from
releasing shippers (i.e., shippers exercising capacity release) with firm
transportation rights between two locations. Moreover, flexible receipt
and delivery points can be used to avoid bottlenecks.
From an economic standpoint, a more meaningful measure of
market share is one based on the relative capacities of shippers holding
firm transportation service capacity rights, and not on the number of
pipelines connected to individual shippers. After all, market shares
should be calculated with an understanding of who competes in the
relevant market. Since transportation services may be acquired from the
shippers holding FT contractual rights on pipelines, as well as from
pipeline owners directly, market shares are accurately measured by the
relative capacities of shippers' FT capacity rights. Under such an

increase imposed by all sellers. In contrast, the demand elasticity facing an individual firm
measures the percentage of change in the quantity of sales by that firm in response to a
price increase by that firm, assuming all other sellers maintain their current prices. The
elasticity of demand facing an individual firm can be much more elastic than the market
demand elasticity. See, e.g., CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 87, ch. 4.
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assessment, the share held by the pipeline itself should be considered to
be the amount of unsold capacity as a percentage of total pipeline
capacity. We note that such an understanding of market share with
regard to natural gas transportation is not without precedent, as
Commission staff has previously presented testimony consistent with
47
this view.
3. Requirementsfor Excess Capacity
A pipeline applying for market-based rates should not have to
show that rival suppliers have excess capacity equal to the applicant's
own capacity in the relevant market in order to demonstrate a lack of
market power. 148 Such a standard requires that, for an applicant with,
say, a 20 percent market share, the other firms in the market collectively
must have at least 20 percent excess capacity (or an average of five
percent each) in order to demonstrate conclusively the lack of market
power. While such a standard is usually sufficient to demonstrate a lack
of market power, it will usually be too restrictive. Alternatively, the first
standard may be inadequate to demonstrate a lack of market power if
rivals will not fully use their capacity.
As an example, consider the case of two equally sized firms that
control a market. In that case, excess capacity equal to 50 percent of the
market will probably not be sufficient to ensure competitive outcomes;
with two firms, the downside of launching a price war is apparent, and
competition may not be vigorous. If rival firms sell their excess capacity
in response to an anticompetitive price increase, then generally they do
not have to have excess capacity equal to the applicant's capacity in
order to make a price increase unprofitable. As we demonstrate below,
for instance, five firms each with 20 percent of the market and excess
capacity of two percent each, for a total of 10 percent, is probably
sufficient to ensure nearly competitive outcomes.
A standard requiring that a pipeline applying for market-based
rates must show that rival suppliers have excess capacity equal to the
applicant's own capacity implicitly assumes that rivals will use their
excess capacity to exploit any exercise of market power. This is usually a
reasonable assumption, but one that is more likely to hold when there
are three or more firms present rather than only two. With more firms, it
becomes increasingly likely that at least one of them will vie for a larger
147. Statement of Dr. Jonathan D. Ogur, supra note 32.
148. We present a more detailed discussion of the Commission's excess capacity rule in
our working paper, THE ROLE OF EXCESS CAPACITY IN DETERMINING MARKET POWER IN
NATURAL GAS TRANSPORTATION MARKETS (Univ. of Texas, Austin, Working Paper, 2003)
(on file with authors).
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share. The more firms there are, the greater the chance that one will set
off a price war. In sum, when rivals use their excess capacity to exploit
the exercise of market power, the amount of excess capacity required is
149
relatively small.
4. InterruptibleTransportation
The ability of a pipeline to sell unutilized capacity as
interruptible transportation service (ITS) makes that product market
more competitive relative to the case where the pipeline does not have
residual rights to the capacity reserved by shippers. The intuition for this
result is as follows. Shippers with firm transportation rights exercise
market power by withholding their capacity. Such an attempt to reduce
quantity can be undone by the pipeline, by recovering the unused
capacity and reselling it. That is, the pipeline maximizes profit by taking
a portion of the unused capacity and reselling it.
The analysis of market power in interruptible transportation
markets proceeds as follows. First, if demand for capacity is sufficiently
high, then shippers with firm transportation rights will use all available
capacity. In this case, no market power is exercised. Second, if demand
for capacity is at an intermediate level, then shippers withhold some
capacity to increase the value of their shipments, absent the pipeline's
residual rights. However, the existence of the pipeline's residual rights
ensures that all capacity is used. Both of these cases correspond to
competitive behavior since no capacity is withheld from the market.
Third, if demand for capacity is low, the existence of the pipeline's
residual rights causes shippers to withhold less capacity than they would
have in the absence of the pipeline's residual rights, and, in addition,
some of the withheld capacity is recovered and released by the pipeline.
In this case, the pipeline's ability to resell unused firm capacity as
interruptible capacity has the effect of reducing the price-cost margin
relative to the case where a pipeline does not have such residual rights.
5. IncorporatingBuyer Power
As discussed previously, the HHI and the corresponding
analysis on which it is premised assume that buyers in a given market
are dispersed and exert no power over price. However, one important
aspect of the market for firm transportation capacity is that buyers hold
large shares of available contract quantities and can therefore exert some
149. For example, even when market demand is highly inelastic, e.g., c = 0.1, a firm with
a market share of 49 percent or less would not find it profitable to increase its price as long
as rival suppliers possess excess capacity of at least 15 percent of the market.

Summer 2004]

INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS TRANSPORT

degree of buyer power in the market for firm transportation service. This
fact has important implications for the analysis of the market power
potentially exercisable by any particular supplier of firm transportation
service. Specifically, it implies that relying solely upon the HHI
statistic - regardless of the shares upon which it is based - is inconsistent
with the Commission's stated guideline to consider the effect of buyer
power. In order to be consistent with the Commission's approach, one
must con-sider the competitive implications of buyer power1 50
Despite its recognition that buyer power should be taken into
account when assessing the market power potentially exercisable by a
provider of natural gas transportation, the FERC's reliance on the HHI as
the primary tool for this analysis fails in this task. Simply put, the HHI
does not take buyer power into account. The HHI, which is after all a
measure of seller concentration within a market, carries with it the
implicit assumption that only sellers, and not buyers, are capable of
exercising market power and influencing price. Furthermore, focusing
solely on the HHI assumes that the power of sellers is determinative and
that market power necessarily results when sellers have concentrated
power. Too great a reliance on the HHI ignores the possibility of power
concentration in buyers and the resulting reduction of the anticompetitive effects of concentrated seller power1 51 Conversely, the HHI
will not reflect the presence of anticompetitive effects that arise from a
change in market structure but do not alter the degree of seller
152
concentration.
150. Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 61,234.
151. A commonly cited example involves purchases made by the U.S. Department of
Defense, since many of the industries from which the Pentagon buys contain no more than
one to three firms. Such extreme seller concentration has less effect in these instances than
it would otherwise, because there is only one buyer who possesses a good ability to dictate
the terms of trade. While seller concentration in defense industries likely increases prices
modestly over those that might prevail with many more sellers, the monopsony power of
the buyer mitigates the effects of seller concentration.
152. A good example of a case in which the HHI fails to represent the competitive
nature of a market is found in the case of gasoline in California. The seven largest refiners
of gasoline in California comprise approximately 95 percent of the production of gasoline
sold in the state. See, e.g., PennWell, Surveys and Reports, OIL & GAS J. ONLINE (2000), at
http://ogj.pennnet.com/survey/survey.cfm?Section=Survey (last visited Aug. 25, 2004).
However, the seven largest buyers of refined gasoline likewise constitute over 95 percent of
retail sales. Thus, the wholesale California gasoline market is comprised of large sellers and
large buyers. If a buyer in the retail market were to merge with a seller in the refinery
market, the resulting effect on the competitiveness of the refinery market would not be
reflected in the HHl because that index speaks only to the relative competitiveness of the
post-merger market by taking into account a particular market's concentration. Since in this
example there would be no merger in the refinery market, the HHI for that market would
not change and could not indicate any anticompetitive change in market structure. Yet,
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To see why this is so, consider the example of a market for
natural gas transportation that is served by only two sellers. With many
buyers, such a market is unlikely to achieve competitive performance,
since the sellers realize that price-cutting ultimately lowers their profits.
If the market had a single large buyer, however, that buyer could
threaten to take its business to a single seller. Such a threat would force
the sellers to offer nearly competitive prices. Moreover, the mere
presence of a large and powerful buyer may be sufficient to ensure that
all buyers in the market-large and small-are protected from the
exercise of seller power. Capacity release grants the large buyer the
ability to become a seller itself; by acquiring more firm transportation
rights than it needs for its own downstream customers, the large buyer
can offer the excess capacity to smaller shippers in competition with the
pipeline, thereby constraining the ability of the pipeline to maintain price
above competitive levels. Note that under each of these scenarios, the
number and size of the suppliers remains constant. A determination of
market power based solely on the HHI would suggest that suppliers
restrict output and raise price in a uniform manner in all circumstances.
This is patently not the case.
A reasoned assessment of market power, however, will not
necessarily exclude consideration of the effect of seller concentration
within the market. High seller concentration is, of course, a prerequisite
for the exercise of market power by a supplier, but it should be obvious
from the discussion above that seller concentration by itself is an
inconclusive measure of the ability to raise price above the competitive
level for a significant period of time. Fortunately, this difficulty can be
addressed. As shown below, the HHI can be modified to take buyer
power into account.

clearly, something has changed; in this case, the buyer in the refinery market can now
influence the price of refined gasoline by virtue of its vertical integration with the refiners.
Thus, in markets in which buyers are concentrated, the traditional HHI model is incapable
of characterizing the competitive structure of the market and, therefore, incapable of
providing information on market competitiveness. Recent research by Professors Justine
Hastings and Richard Gilbert shows that the high degree of vertical integration in
California significantly increases retail gasoline prices, even with no change in the HHI.
JUSTINE HASTINGS, VERTICAL RELATIONSHIPS AND COMPETITION IN RETAIL GASOLINE
MARKETS: AN EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM CONTRACT CHANGES IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

(Competition Pol'y Ctr., Working Paper No. CPC0O-010, 2000), available at http://
repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cpc/CPC0O-010 (last visited Aug. 14, 2004); RICHARD GILBERT &
JUSTINE HASTINGS, VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN GASOLINE SUPPLY: AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF
RAISING RIVALS' COSTS (Competition Pol'y Ctr., Working Paper No. CPC01-21, 2001),
2
available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cpc/CPCOl- 1 (last visited Aug. 14, 2004).
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Specifically, Professors R. Preston McAfee and Ken Hendricks
have calculated a "modified HHI" (or MHI) statistic, 15 3 which offers an
adjusted measure of market concentration that takes into account also
the presence of buyer power. The key insight of this work is that when
one firm operates as both a buyer and seller, purchases the firm makes
from itself cannot be subjected to market power. That is, the upstream
division of the firm will not exert market power over the downstream
division of the same firm. Thus, a modified HHI accounts for the extent
to which buyers purchase from themselves. 154
The MHI does more than offer an adjusted measure of market
concentration, however. Instead, it provides a measure of the extent to
which equilibrium prices likely will exceed marginal costs, based on the
1 55
structure of the market and the elasticities of supply and demand.
Economists measure the extent to which prices exceed marginal costs by
the "price-cost margin," which equals price less marginal cost, divided
by price. In markets in which no buyer power exists and in which firms
do not react to changes in rivals' outputs, the price-cost margin is
156
determined by the HHI and the elasticity of demand (denoted as "e").
This equivalence is expressed as follows: (p - mc) / p = HHI / e.
Now consider a market in which buyers have some market
power but do not compete with each other in downstream markets.157 In
this market, firms will attempt to equate their marginal costs with their
marginal valuations of the product. The average difference between the
marginal value of the intermediate good (i.e., unbundled gas
transportation) and its marginal cost is approximately proportional to
the sum of the firms' squared "net market shares." By "net" shares, we
mean that each firm's upstream market share (i.e., a shipper's share of FT
contract capacity reaching the relevant destination market) is netted
against its downstream share (i.e., a shipper's share of retail gas
th
consumption in the relevant destination market). Thus, let si be the i
firm's share of the total consumption, and ai be the share of the total
production. Then the difference between (1) the average marginal value
153. R. PRESTON MCAFEE & KENNETH HENDRICKS, A THEORY OF BILATERAL OLIGOPOLY,
WITH APPLICATIONS TO VERTICAL MERGERS (Univ. of Texas, Austin, Working Paper, 2000)
(on file with authors).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. STEPHEN MARTIN, ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 167 (2d ed. 2002). The
manner in which firms interact in responding to changes in rivals' outputs is known as the
"conjectural variation." If firms are assumed not to react to changes in rivals' outputs, the
market model is the well-known Cournot model. Id.
157. This is the case for local distribution companies, which generally do not compete
with each other for buyers.
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and (2) the average marginal cost equals the sum of squares of si- o/,
divided by an appropriate elasticity that reflects the elasticities for both
58
consumption and production.1
An analysis of buyer power requires one to determine the shares
of firm transportation rights held by individual shippers on pipelines
connected to a particular LDC. In addition to this, however, there are
two other parameters necessary to an analysis of buyer power: an
elasticity of demand (specifically, "downstream retail elasticity") and an
elasticity of supply ("upstream cost elasticity"). The elasticity of demand
measures the sensitivity of the quantity demanded to a change in price.
If demand is determined to be highly elastic with regard to price, this
entails that the ability of sellers to increase prices is limited, since price
increases are met with large decreases in demand. Similarly, the
elasticity of supply measures the responsiveness of suppliers to price
changes; a high elasticity of supply limits the ability of buyers to exert
market power because attempts to depress prices result in large
reductions in supplies. The MHI advanced by McAfee and Hendricks
takes elasticities into account and applies them to an assessment of
159
market performance in natural gas transportation.
In markets for natural gas transportation, both these elasticities
are likely to be relatively low, suggesting that large changes in price are
required to affect the quantity supplied or demanded appreciably.
Moreover, since shippers' demand for natural gas transportation is
derived from their demand for natural gas, the derived demand
elasticity for natural gas transportation is likely to be less elastic than the
demand for natural gas itself. Econometric studies show that the demand
for natural gas is relatively inelastic; given this, the derived demand
elasticity for natural gas transportation likely is less than 1.0 (in absolute
value).160 Similarly, the "upstream cost elasticity" is also likely to be low
because suppliers of transportation services (i.e., pipeline owners and
shippers holding FT rights) are constrained in responding to changes in
price. They are constrained by physical capacity limitations of the
Specifically, let V1 be the marginal value of the ith firm, p be the price, and C' be

158.

the marginal cost. Let e be the demand elasticity and be the supply elasticity. Let si be the
h
il firm's market share of consumption, and o, the share of production. Then the formula is:
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159. McAFEE & HENDRICKS, supra note 153.
160. G.S. Maddala et al., Estimation of Short-run and Long-run Elasticities of Energy
Demandfrom Panel Data: Using Shrinkage Estimators, 15 J. Bus. & ECON. STAT. 90 (1997); G.S.
Maddala et al., A ComparativeStudy of Different Shrinkage Estimatorsfor Panel Data Models, 2
ANNALs ECON. & FIN. 1 (2001).
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pipelines and by the size of shipper contracts already claiming a portion
of that capacity. As with elasticity of demand, evidence from
econometric studies supports a finding that the supply of natural gas is
relatively inelastic; as a result, the upstream cost elasticity for natural gas
transportation is also likely to be less than 1.0.161
In sum, the MHI statistic yields not simply a measure of market
concentration, but rather an estimate of the equilibrium price-cost
margin given the degree of upstream and downstream market
concentration, as well as the elasticities of supply and demand. Since
economists measure market power by the extent to which prices exceed
marginal costs, the MHI therefore provides a direct measure of the
ability of firms to exercise market power. And as discussed above, direct
measures of the exercise of market power are preferable over indirect
measures like the HHI. Moreover, using the MHI statistic, we can
calculate the equilibrium quantity that will be produced in the market as
a percentage of the quantity that would be produced in a perfectly
competitive market.
The MHI can be calculated for natural gas pipelines, but, in
doing so, we caution the reader to take into account the substantial
difference between short-run marginal costs and long-run marginal
costs. By "short run," we refer to the period over which some of a firm's
inputs (such as the physical pipelines) are fixed, and therefore cannot be
increased or decreased, while others (such as compressor fuel) can be
varied. By "long run," we refer to the period over which all of a firm's
inputs are variable. Hence the tautology: "there are no fixed costs in the
long run." In the short run, a pipeline's marginal costs are quite low,
since most of the firm's costs are fixed. In the long run, how-ever, a
pipeline's marginal costs are relatively high since they must include the
capital costs of replacing the pipeline. In this regard, the MHI statistic
should be understood as a reflection of the relationship between price
and long-run (not short-run) marginal costs. This is to be expected, since
transportation rates must necessarily exceed short-run marginal costs;
otherwise, the firm could not afford to replace its most important fixed
input-the pipeline itself-and thus would find it unprofitable to
operate in the long run.
By expressing the relationship between price and long-run
marginal cost, the MHI provides an indication of the "competitiveness"
of pipeline transportation markets. When properly applied to natural gas
pipelines, the MHI statistic yields not simply a measure of market
161.

Christophe Barret, U.S. Natural Gas Market: A Disequilibrium Approach, PROC. OF

INT'L ASS'N FOR ENERGY ECON. 15TH INT'L CONFERENCE, COPING WITH THE ENERGY FUTURE:
MARKETS AND REGULATIONS (1992).
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concentration, but rather an estimate of the equilibrium price-cost
margin given the degree of upstream and downstream market
concentration, as well as the elasticities of supply and demand. An
additional benefit of the MHI is that it makes it possible to calculate the
equilibrium quantity that will be produced in the market as a percentage
of the quantity that would have been produced in a perfectly competitive
market. The MHI can be used to do the following: to predict market
output as a percentage of perfectly efficient market output; to estimate
the increase in predicted transportation rates that would be implied if
buyer power were not taken into account; and to calculate the percent of
distortion in the predicted price of transportation, taking both buyer and
seller power into account, when compared to the perfectly efficient
162
transportation rate.
V. CONCLUSION
As discussed above, there have been a number of significant
changes in the natural gas transportation industry over the last few
years. Wholesale markets have grown, and an integrated spot market
has been developed to serve a broad geographic scope. New and
innovative opportunities for trading have emerged with the appearance
of upstream and downstream market centers and with the development
of an active financial market in gas futures. Released capacity has
become widely available, facilitated in part by an increase in the use of
information technologies to distribute and update pipeline and shipper
information quickly. "Virtual pipelines" have in effect created new links
between receipt and delivery points not physically connected by the
facilities of a single pipeline manager. And, over all, prices have declined
without any additional threat to quality or reliability.
At the same time, there have been recent contributions to the
economic analysis of market power that are relevant to the regulatory
assessment of petitions for market-based rates for natural gas
transportation. These include additional scrutiny of the relevant product
and geographic markets for natural gas transportation and the
identification of direct methodologies for examining whether or not
market power has in fact been exercised. More significantly, however,
recent economic study has highlighted the limitations inherent in a
traditional structural analysis of market power relying solely upon a
simple measure of market concentration like the HHI. New tools are
available to economists and regulators that correct for these limitations,

162.

The NMI has been applied by the FTC in the analysis of oil mergers.
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considering as they do characteristics of entry, seller power, elasticity of
demand, and available capacity. A "modified HHI" measure that takes
these characteristics into account appears a much more robust and
reliable tool for assessing possible market power.
We respectfully suggest that current market power methodology
as set forth in the 1996 Policy Statement may unnecessarily be delaying
the transition to fully competitive transportation markets. To date, only
two proposals for market-based rates by interstate pipelines have been
advanced. Koch advanced the first, which was denied by federal
regulators. 163 The second application was filed for a small segment of the
KN system, and although approval was granted, the market-based rates
were never placed into effect.164 It is not clear, however, that these
petitions would have threatened an exercise of market power had the
developments identified in this article been considered as part of the
assessment. Other pipelines have not followed the example of Koch and
KN, choosing instead to refrain from applying for market-based rates.
Even though there is evidence to suggest that at least some of these other
pipelines are not capable of achieving or exercising market power, the
methodology of the 1996 Policy Statement as currently interpreted may
not adequately reflect this. 165 If the scarcity of applications by market
participants for market-based rates is a result of regulatory hurdles that
are recognized to be too high, then the FERC's current method for
determining market power may in some instances be delaying, rather
than promoting, the transition to market-based rates. The implication is
that regulation may currently exist where it is not strictly needed.
Many studies have documented the benefits of deregulation in
the U.S. economy. For example, the dollar value of deregulation in the
airline, rail, and trucking industries has been estimated at $60 billion
annually. 166 Conversely, the dollar cost of regulation has been estimated
at more than $700 billion annually. 167 Clearly, in circumstances where
deregulation is appropriate, e.g., because markets become more competitive, such efforts should be pursued in order to enhance consumer
welfare.
In our view, all of these considerations taken together suggest
that modifications to the FERC's view of (and guidelines surrounding
the determination of) market power for natural gas transportation are
163.
Koch Gateway Order, supra note 12.
164. See sources cited supra note 11.
165. See, e.g., PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE NATURAL GAS MARKET: SIXTY YEARS OF
REGULATION AND DEREGULATION (2000).
166. W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 38 (2000).
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warranted. The 1996 Policy Statement as it stands is a valuable set of
tools and guidelines for examining the industry, but we feel that this
foundation can be built upon and strengthened further. We recommend
that the Policy Statement be modified along the lines suggested
throughout this article - that is, updated to recognize explicitly the
recent and substantial changes to markets for natural gas transportation
and the economic tools for market power assessment.

